CASE COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-CIRCUITs DISAGREE, ON VALIDITY OF
FPC ORDERS OUTLAWING INDEFINITE PRICE-ESCALATION CLAUSES
IN CONTRACTS FOR SAT

OF NATURAL GAS

In a series of orders issued pursuant to section 16 of the Natural Gas
Act,' the Federal Power Commission stated that it would thereafter summarily reject all applications for certificates of public convenience and
necessity and all contracts for the sale of natural gas which contained
indefinite price-escalation clauses. 2 Pursuant to the act,3 several inde' The Commission shall have power . . . to prescribe, issue, make, amend,
and rescind such orders, rules, and regulations as it may find necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this chapter ....
52 Stat 830 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1958).
2 Price-escalation clauses provide for future increases in the price to be paid to
the natural gas producer for his product. These clauses become operative on the
occurrence of certain events described in the contract. See generally Trigg, Escalation Clauses in Public Utility Rate Schedules, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 964 (1958).
The FPC orders are as follows: Order No. 232:
Any provision for a change of price of the seller by reason of indefinite
escalation clauses . . . contained in a contract for the sale or transportation
of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission tendered for
filing on or after April 1, 1961, shall be inoperative and of no effect at law.
25 F.P.C. 379, 381 (1961).
Order No. 232A:
In contracts executed on or after April 3, 1961, for the sale or transportation of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, any provision for a change of price other than the following provisions shall be
inoperative and of no effect at law; the permissible provisions for a change
in price are:
(1) . . . [provisions dealing with price changes to cover tax increases];
(2) provisions that change a price to a specified amount at a definite date;
and
(3) provisions that, once in five-year contract periods . . . , change a price
at a definite date by a price-redetermination based upon and not higher
than a producer rate or producer rates which are subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, are not in issue in suspension or certificate
proceedings, and are in the area of the price in question.
25 F.P.C. 609, 610 (1961).
Order No. 242:
Any contract executed on and after April 2, 1962, and filed in support of
an applicant's gas supply showing will be given no consideration in determining adequacy of gas supply if it contains any price-changing provisions
other than those defined as permissible in [Order No. 232A] . . . hereof.
On or after April 2, 1962 (the application [for a certificate of public convenience and necessity] . . . shall be rejected if any contract submitted in
support thereof contains any price-changing provisions other than those
defined as permissible in [Order No. 232A] . . . hereof.
27 F.P.C. 339, 340 (1962).
3 (c) Under such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe,
every natural-gas company shall file with the Commission . . . schedules showing all rates and charges for any transportation or sale subject
to the jurisdiction of the Commission . . . together with all contracts
which in any manner affect or relate to such rates, charges, classifications, and services.
(909)
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pendent producers 4 filed contracts for the sale of natural gas with the
FPC and, at the same time, applied for certificates of public convenience
and necessity to enable them to sell this gas to a pipeline company for resale
in interstate commerce. After finding in these contracts price-escalation
clauses not conforming to the previously announced criteria, the Commission rejected the applications without a hearing.5 On review, the Ninth
Circuit held that the Commission had general rulemaking power to issue
the challenged orders, and that the Commission was not required to hold
adjudicative hearings on individual applications which on their face violated
the price-escalation regulations. Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601
(9th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3228 (U.S. Dec. 24,
1963) (No. 684). The Tenth Circuit, however, held the order invalid. 6
Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 317 F.2d 796 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 375 U.S.
902 (1963).
In PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,7 the Supreme Court held that
independent producers of natural gas are within the FPC's jurisdiction
under the Natural Gas Act. After the Phillips decision the Commission
was deluged with rate filings and applications for certificates of public
convenience and necessity from these independent producers; as a result
the Commission has been faced with a growing backlog of cases.8 Much
(e) Whenever any such new schedule is filed the Commission shall have
authority . . . to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of

such rate, charge, classification, or service; and, pending such hearing
and the decision thereon, the Commission . . . may suspend the opera-

tion of such schedule and defer the use of such rate, charge, classification,
or service, but not for a longer period than five months beyond the time
when it would otherwise go into effect . . . and after full hearings

. . . the Commission may make such orders with reference thereto as
would be proper in a proceeding initiated after it had become effective.
. . . At any hearing involving a rate or charge sought to be increased,
the burden of proof to show that the increased charge is just and reasonable shall be upon the natural-gas company ....
52 Stat. 822 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1958).
(c) No natural-gas company or person which will be a natural-gas company
upon completion of any proposed construction or extension shall engage
in the transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction
of the Commission . . . unless there is in force with respect to such

natural-gas company a certificate of public convenience and necessity
issued by the Commission authorizing such acts or operations ....
(e)

. . . The Commission shall have the power to attach to the issuance

of the certificate and to the exercise of the rights granted thereunder
such reasonable terms and conditions as the public convenience and
necessity may require.
56 Stat. 83 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717f (1958).
4 independent producers own no pipelines and do not engage in interstate transportation of natural gas. See Mosburg, Regulation of the Independent Producer by
the Federal Power Commission, 16 OKLA. L. Rv. 249 (1963).
5 See Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 317 F.2d 796, 804 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 375 U.S.
902 (1963).
6 Only Order No. 242 was declared void. The court held that Orders No. 232
and No. 232A were merely advisory and could not serve as a basis for summary
rejection of producer filings. Id. at 807.
7 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
8In Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537, 546 (1960), the FPC said:
If our present staff were immediately tripled, and if all our new employees
would be as competent as those we now have, we would not reach a current
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of the difficulty stems from the Natural Gas Act's requirement that the
Commission hold individual hearings when it questions the reasonableness
of proposed rate filings or contract provisions 2 These hearings are of
necessity long and complicated.
The FPC argues that this problem is aggravated by the presence of
indefinite price-escalation clauses in contracts between producers and pipeline companies. One such clause is the so-called favored-nation clause
under which the pipeline company agrees with the producer that the price
paid to the latter shall never be less than that paid to other producers for
gas of like quality delivered under comparable conditions within a defined
area.10 Since these clauses are now generally included in producer-pipeline
company contracts, a rate increase or a new contract calling for a higher
rate for one producer will automatically lead to simultaneous rate filings
by all other producers in the same area who sell to the same pipeline company. Another prominent indefinite price-escalation clause is the priceredetermination provision which allows the producer to require a redetermination of the original contract price at intermittent bargaining sessions
with the pipeline company."' The new rate which the parties agree upon
is then submitted to the Commission for approval. Since the pipeline company can usually pass along any increased cost to its customers and ultimately to the consumers, it does not have a strong incentive to resist a new
rate filing. Thus, these "bargaining" sessions are likely to be nothing more
than determinations by the producer and the pipeline company of the highest
reasonable rate, and the filing is not necessarily based on any increased costs
2
of the producer.'
The Commission has contended that sections 4, 5, and 7 of the Natural
Gas Act provide it with substantive power to prohibit these clauses. Section
4 requires the Commission to approve all new contracts and rate increases
13
and empowers it to modify those which are not just and reasonable.
Section 5 gives the Commission power to institute investigations into cornstatus in our independent producer rate work until 2043 A.D.-eighty-two and
one-half years from now. .

.

. If we increased our efficiency one thousand

percent, we would achieve current status in 1968-eight and two-tenths years

See

from now.
also JAFFE & NATHENSOx, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 309-11 (2d ed. 1961); Mason,

Problems in Regulation of Interstate Operations of Producers Under the Natural
Gas Act, 14 AD. L. REv. 59 (1961); Mosburg, supra note 4; Munn, The Lesso; of
the Independent Gas ProducerRegulatory Experiment, 14 AD. L. REv. 40 (1961).
9 See City of Detroit v. FPC, 230 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 829 (1956). But see Phillips Petroleum Co., supra note 8, in which the FPC
has attempted to avoid City of Detroit by setting rates based on an area price, rather
than on the producers' cost. See Note 26 infra and accompanying text.
1o See Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601, 604 n.6 (9th Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3228 (U.S. Dec. 24, 1963) (No. 684).
"1See id. at 603 n.5.
I2 Under the FPC's permissible price-redetermination clause, see note 2 supra
(Order No. 232A), the producer and pipeline company will be unable to file for rates
which are higher than those already approved by the Commission for that area at
the time of the rate filing.
13 See note 3 supra.
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pany contracts and rates on its own motion and to modify unjust or unreasonable contract terms.14 Finally, section 7 empowers the Commission
to issue certificates of public convenience and necessity for the transportation or sale of natural gas in interstate commerce.' 5 In order to protect
the public interest, the Commission may condition the issuance of certificates
with "such reasonable terms and conditions as the public convenience and
necessity may require." 16
The FPC claims that indefinite price-escalation clauses are not in the
public interest because they lead to simultaneous rate filings which have no
economic justification, and because the clauses themselves are often so

complicated that the Commission must spend much of its time construing
them '7 rather than determining whether the proposed increase is just
and reasonable, Is itself a complicated and burdensome process.' 9 Thus,
the increased administrative workload caused by the triggering of indefinite

price-escalation clauses decreases the Commission's ability to protect the
public interest. 20
The gas producers, on the other hand, argue that the industry's economic structure requires indefinite escalation clauses. They contend that a
gas company cannot reasonably undertake the tremendous investment

needed to construct a pipeline unless it is assured of a long-term supply of
gas, which is usually obtained through long-term contracts with the producer. Price-escalation provisions are defended as an insurance of the continued fairness of the producer's selling price over the length of the contract period. 2 1 The FPC recognizes that these long-term contracts are in
14 (a) Whenever the Commission, after a hearing . . . shall find that any
rate, charge, or classification demanded, observed, charged, or collected by
any natural-gas company in connection with any transportation or sale of
natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule,
regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification
is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule,
regulation, practice, or contract ....
52 Stat. 823 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §717d (1958).
35 See note 3 supra.
1656 Stat 83 (1942), 15 U.S.C. §717f(e) (1958).
17 See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956).
Under the Mobile doctrine, if a producer cannot get the acceleration clause he wants
written into the contract and accepted by the FPC, he will not be allowed at a later
date to file unilaterally for increases which would have been covered by the proposed
contract provisions.
18 See Brief for Respondent, pp. 12-19; Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 317 F.2d 796 (10th
Cir. 1963).
19 See note 27 infra and accompanying text
20 See Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537 (1960); Brief for Respondent,
pp. 12-19, Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1963).
The Supreme Court has said that in determining what rates and contracts are
in the public interest the Commission should consider the triggering effect of a producer's proposed rate. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n (Catco), 360 U.S.
378, 391 (1959).
It would seem to follow that the Commission should also consider
whether a proposed contract contains filing provisions-favored-nations clauses-that
may be triggered by subsequent rates.
21 See Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 317 F2d 796, 799 (10th Cir. 1963).
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the public interest,.' but counters that the limited price-escalation clauses
permitted by its orders are sufficient to protect the producers' interests.P
Since the clauses result in increased rates, they may be unfair to the
ultimate gas consumer even though they cannot cause an immediate increase
in the price of natural gas. The act allows the Commission to supend new
rates for a maximum of five months while it conducts hearings; under the
present circumstances, it is unlikely that the Commission will be able to
hold a hearing within the five-month period due to the complexity of many
of the indefinite price-escalation clauses, the difficulty of fixing a fair rate,
and the Commission's present backlog. After the five months have elapsed,
the company may put the new rates into effect, subject to refund by the
company if the Commission eventually finds the new rate excessive.P
There is no guarantee, however, that the refund will be passed all the way
back to the consumer. If a particular consumer has died, moved away,
or is a leaseholder whose rent included the cost of gas, he will receive
little protection from the FPC's power retroactively to declare the rate
excessive. Furthermore, even absent these contingencies, the consumer
as a class may not benefit from the FPC's rate determination since local
public utilities commissions may not reduce the local rate, or the local
rate reduction may be prospective only.2
When the Commission speaks of "economically justified" rate increase
filings, it seems to be referring to proposed rates which can be justified by
the producer's operating costs.2 6 Under this rationale it seems clear that
the FPC orders are within its statutory power, because only those filings
which are cost justified are in the public interest37 The Commission's
22 See 25 F.P.C. 379 (1961) (Order No. 232).
23 See note 2 mtpra (Order No. 232A).
Commissioner Kline, dissenting from that part of Order No. 232 which outlaws
negotiated price-redetermination clauses, contends that these clauses are most likely
to reflect economic conditions in the industry. He argues that clauses permitting
specified increases at specified future dates, which Order No. 232A allows, cannot
take into account sudden increases in producer costs or many other variables which
affect the fair price for the producer. The Texaco and Pan-American contracts
contained only negotiated price-redetermination clauses, while Superior's contract
contained both favored-nation and price-redetermination clauses.
2A See note 3 supra. The Commission's only alternative method of modifying
rates and contract provisions is through a § 5 investigation initiated on its own motion.
See note 14 .rupra and accompanying text. However, a § 5 proceeding is not an
adequate substitute to protect the public interest, since it contains no refund provision, and under its terms the Commission, rather than the company, has the burden
of proving that the proposed rate or contract term is not in the public interest. See
Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n (Catco), 360 U.S. 378, 389-90 (1959).
25 See N.Y. Times, March 1, 1964, § 3, p. 1, col. 6. See generally Trigg, supra
note 2.
26 See Brief for Respondent, pp. 12-19, Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 317 F.2d 796 (10th
Cir. 1963). This would be the standard demanded by City of Detroit v. FPC, 230
F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956) ; however, if the FPC's
new method of rate-making is upheld, see note 27 infra, the standard would be the
the area field price.
27 See City of Detroit v. FPC, supra note 26. In Phillips Petroleum Co., 24
F.P.C. 537 (1960), the FPC announced its intention to substitute an area price scheme
for the traditional individual rate base or cost of service formula. However, the
Commission decided the Phillips case by using the latter method. This decision was
affirmed by the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294 (1963), but the
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orders protect the producer's right to file for cost-justified increases by
permitting redetermination clauses which allow the parties to agree on an
increase to rates no higher than those already approved by the FPC for
that area. While protecting the producer, this limitation also affords the
consumer additional protection because the rates will-have been approved
by the Commission in a rate hearing before they ever go into effect. Under
the prohibited clauses, on the other hand, the new rate filings, which may go
into effect after five months, are based on rates which have not yet received
FPC approval, due to the current backlog of cases. Thus, the new regulations not only will decrease the Commission's workload, but also will allow
the Commission to hold the price line, without sacrificing the producer's
right to file for an increase, in accordance with his contract terms, when
there is a general price increase in his area. If an individual producer
believes that his own cost situation is so unusual as to justify increases
out of line with rates already approved by the Commission, he may ask
for a waiver of the indefinite price-escalation orders when he files his contract.2 8 The waiver of the order would be necessary in order to leave the
producer free to file later for a rate higher than one already approved.
However, to obtain such a waiver the producer would have to file a petition setting forth the specific facts relied upon to support the petition. 2
The Commission would then decide whether the petition on its face had
sufficient merit to warrant a hearing on the waiver issue. In these cases,
the facts relied upon would relate to circumstances peculiar to the particular
company requesting the waiver or to the particular transaction in question.
The companies argue, however, that private parties have the right to
set their price and escalation terms by contract under the Natural Gas
1
the court of appeals held that,
Act. 30 In Willinut Gas & Oil Co. v. FPC,3
under the general rulemaking provision of the act, the Commission had no
statutory authority to promulgate an order which deprived a gas company of its right to file for a rate increaseY32 The orders involved here,
Court refused to pass on the validity of area pricing. If this method of setting rates
is eventually upheld by the Supreme Court, the Commission's limitation on priceredetermination clauses will substantially cut down on the complexity of hearings
necessitated by filings under such clauses, because when the producer files for an
increase under the type of price-redetermination clause which the Commission now
allows, his proposed rates will be within rates already approved by the Commission
for that area.
28 See Brief for Respondent, p. 17, Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601 (9th
Cir. 1963).
29 18 C.F.R. § 1.7(a) (b), as amended, Order No. 255, 28 F.P.C. 790 (1962).
30 The Natural Gas Act permits the relations between the parties to be established initially by contract, the protection of the public interest being afforded
by supervision of the individual contracts, which to that end must be filed
with the Commission and made public.
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 339 (1956).
31294 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 975 (1962).
32 Cf. Hunt v. FPC, 306 F.2d 334, 341-42 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 375
U.S. 810 (1963). But cf. Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. FPC, 293 F.2d 572 (10th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 976 (1962).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has recently expressed
the opinion that the general rule-making provision of the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat.
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however, do not deprive a company of the right to file for a specific increase,
as was the case in Wilimut, but merely limit the contractual methods that
may be employed to those which are in the public interest. Moreover, the
general limitation on the right to file imposed by these orders is not inconsistent with the act's reliance on private contract as the means by which
Congress intended to protect producers who might be faced with sharply
rising production costs during the periods covered by their contracts.3s
It is argued that even if the FPC has the authority to disallow these
clauses, the substantive sections on which the Commission relies require
a hearing, and therefore the Commission may limit permissible contract
provisions only by individual adjudication. However, in United States v.
Storer Broadcasting Co.,34 the Supreme Court held that the Federal Communications Commission could reject without a hearing Storer's application for a license despite hearing provisions in the Federal Communications Act similar to those in the Natural Gas Act. The Court based its
decision on the fact that the application on its face showed a violation of
substantively valid FCC regulations. Once the substantive validity of the
FPC regulations involved in the present cases is established,3. 5 the Storer
doctrine should be equally applicable to the FPC.
Although it was claimed that if given the opportunity at a hearing the
company would have shown that the price-redetermination and favorednation clauses contained in its contract are directly related to the economic
requirements of the industry in general and to its own economic position
in particular,3 6 industry-wide conditions were considered by the Commission when it framed its orders, 37 and particular conditions relating to a
single producer or a single transaction can be brought to the Commission's
attention by applying for a waiver of the FPC orders when the contract is
filed 3 8 Since none of the producers in these cases applied for a waiver,
it appears that if they were granted an adjudicatory hearing they would only
830 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1958), gives the FPC a broad grant of power. In
upholding a Commission order dealing with the issuance of temporary certificates

of public convenience and necessity, the court said:
All authority of the Commission need not be found in explicit language.

Section 16 demonstrates a realization by Congress that the Commission would

be confronted with unforeseen problems of administration in regulating this
huge industry and should have a basis for coping with such confrontation.

While the action of the Commission must conform with the terms, policies
and purposes of the Act, it may use means -which are not in all respects

spelled out in detail.
Public Service Comm'n v. FPC, No. 17673, D.C. Cir., Jan. 2, 1964.
33

See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div., 358

U.S. 103, 114 (1958) ; United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S.
332, 339 (1956).

351 U.S. 192 (1956).
35 See notes 13-16 supra and accompanying text.
34

36

Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601, 609, 610 (9th Cir. 1963).

at 605-08; see 25 F.P.C. 379 (1961).
See notes 28-29 sipra and accompanying text.

a7Id.

38
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be presenting to the Commission arguments which it heard and rejected
39
during the rulemaking proceeding.
0
Such industry-wide facts are "legislative" rather than "adjudicative" 4
-the Commission's resolution of these issues does not turn on factors which
are peculiar to one company, thus calling for an adversary trial type hearing, but rather are the kinds of facts which are helpful in formulating general policies. There is less danger of arbitrary or discriminatory action
since the orders are not applicable to an individual company. Furthermore,
the Commission should be able to evaluate competing factors of industrywide significance on the basis of its administrative expertise in the regulation of natural gas producers. Since these are clearly legislative facts, the
rulemaking procedure is proper and deprives the company of no procedural right.4 '

CORPORATIONS-CoIRPORATION ENJOINED FROM ISSUING NONVOTING COMMON STOCK WHICH WOULD CAUSE DELISTMENT FROM
STOCK EXCHANGE WHEN PREVIOUS PROSPECTUS IMPLIEDLY PROMISED To REMAIN LISTED
In 1957, Carter Products, Inc., a closed corporation controlled by
defendant majority shareholder (Hoyt), sold 500,000 shares of the corporation's voting stock to underwriters who in turn sold those shares to
the public. The prospectus stated that "the Company intends to make
application for the listing of the Common Stock on the New York Stock
The stock was subsequently listed. In 1962, the
Exchange" (NYSE).
directors recommended the creation of a class of nonvoting common stock I
3 9The Commission sought and received comments, memoranda, and briefs on
its proposed rules, pursuant to Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 60 Stat. 238 (1946),
5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1958). See Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601, 605-07 (9th
1963).
Cir. 40
See NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953); DAvis, ADmiNISTRATIV LAW TEXT §§ 7.04, 7.06, 15.03 (1959).
41 Compare Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), with Londoner
v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908), and Jordan v. American Eagle Fire Ins.
Co., 169 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
The Tenth Circuit also held that since there is no record made at a rulemaking
proceeding, there is no way for a court to review the basis for the Commission's
action. See Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 317 F.2d 796, 804-06 (10th Cir. 1963). However,
once the application of the FPC order is challenged and the Commission is forced
to defend its substantive position before an appellate court, its brief and oral argument
will spell out the rationale behind its rulemaking. Furthermore, this argument would
serve to discredit all administrative rulemaking proceedings. It ignores the fact
that the very nature of legislative finding of facts applicable to an entire industry
requires that such administrative action be subject to a narrower scope of review
than the more particularized determination of adjudicative facts. See NLRB v.
Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953); 1 DAvis, ADMINISTRATrVE LAW
TPEATIsE §§ 5.03 to .05, 7.06 (1958) ; 2 id. § 15.03.
1MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 43(a) (1957), permits corporations to deny voting
rights to any class of stock by so providing in the charter.
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to be used for future acquisitions. The admitted purpose of the nonvoting
characteristic was to enable Hoyt to retain majority control of the corporation. Although the shareholders were warned that under NYSE rules
the issuance of nonvoting common stock would cause delistment,2 they
3
approved the recommendation by the statutory two-thirds majority.
5
4
Minority shareholders sued to enjoin the corporation and Hoyt from
effecting the plan. The Circuit Court of Baltimore City held that Hoyt,
as a controlling shareholder, breached his fiduciary duty by voting his
stock for personal benefit against the interests of the corporation. It also
applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel to find an implied promise by
the corporation and Hoyt to remain listed, the abandonment of which was
not justified by a sufficient corporate purpose. United Fund, Inc. v. Carter
Prods. Inc., No. 102A/450, A 42888, Baltimore Cir. Ct., May 16, 1963. 6
The traditional reluctance of courts to interfere with the internal
affairs of corporations has yielded to the realization that controlling share8
holders may be motivated by personal 7 rather than corporate interests.
Hence, many jurisdictions now recognize that when control uses its voting
power for its own benefit, regardless of the adverse interests of the corporation and its stockholders, as such, a fiduciary duty to the corporation
and the stockholders arises entitling them to relief.9 This duty has been
2 The NYSE has refused to list companies with a class of nonvoting stock since
1927. Since 1957 the Exchange has considered the creation of such a class of stock
a cause for delistment. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, CoNsTITUTION AND RULEs
2499.10(3) (CCH 1962).
3
MD. AN. CODE art. 23, § 11(c) (3) (1957). If Hoyt's votes were excluded
from the computation, the proposed amendment would not have received the approval
of two-thirds of the remaining shares. See instant case, Finding of Fact No. 31
(last paragraph).
4 Complainants were three mutual funds which had substantial holdings in Carter
stock. When disenchanted with a company, institutional investors today frequently
voice their objections to management policies rather than dispose of their holdings.
See The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 23, 1963, p. 1, col. 6.
5 Hoyt was also a director and chairman of the board. The opinion treats him
in his capacity as a majority shareholder, and therefore rests on the more modern
concept of control's fiduciary duty rather than the traditional fiduciary duty of directors.
6 The opinion in the present case without the Findings of Fact is reprinted in
151 The Daily Record (Baltimore), Sept. 23, 1963, p. 2. A statement of the case
with selected quotations appears in 32 U.S.L. WEEK 2146 (Baltimore Cir. Ct May
16, 1963).
7 These interests include fringe benefits, pension rights, the effect of the graduated income tax, and the use of assets to buy control of other corporations. The
minority shareholder also has interests besides profit-making; he is interested in
the payment of dividends and having his stock remain freely marketable at a fair
price. Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 CoLUm. L. Rzv. 1212, 1214 (1958).
See the detailed description of the rights and duties of corporate control in Bayne,
A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 22, 29-54 (1963).
8 Compare Thurmond v. Paragon Colliery Co., 82 W. Va. 49, 95 S.E. 816 (1918),
wsith Kahn v. Schiff, 105 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Ohio 1952). Compare White v. Kincaid,
149 N.C. 415, 63 S.E. 109 (1908), with Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369
(7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675 (1942), and Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh
Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919). The turning point was foreshadowed
by such cases as Wheeler v. Abilene Natl Bank Bldg. Co., 159 Fed. 391 (8th Cir.
1908), and Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co., 27 Fed. 625 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886), cert.
denied, 136 U.S. 645 (1890).
0 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919) ; Zahn v. Transamerica
Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947) ; Hyams v. Calumet & Helca Mining Co., 221 Fed.
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recognized by the Maryland courts in recent dicta.'0 Modern courts
closely inspect alleged breaches of duty, and decisions in favor of control
tend to be based on specific findings rather than a laissez-faire judicial
attitude."- The fiduciary label, however, does not negate a broad range
of discretion in corporate managers. The dividing line between permissible discretion and breach of duty is not settled. 12 To upset a corporate
plan, dissenting shareholders must show more than that a better plan might
have been devised 13 or that damage might result to them, 14 but they need
not necessarily show fraud 15 or injury to the corporation.' 6 Benefit to the
corporation should not automatically preclude a finding of a breach of
duty, 17 but many courts simply ask whether the plan was for the benefit
of the corporation or control.' 8
529 (6th Cir. 1915); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. New York & No. Ry., 150
N.Y. 410, 44 N.E. 1043 (1896) ; Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (dictum).
But see Cleary v. Higley, 154 Misc. 158, 277 N.Y. Supp. 63 (Sup. Ct. 1934), aff'd,
246 App. Div. 698, 284 N.Y. Supp. 989 (1935). Compare Honigman v. Green Giant

Co., 309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962). When a majority shareholder does not have a
majority on the board of directors and does not influence the board's action, he is
not responsible for the activity of the directors. It re New York Ry., 82 F.2d 739
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 687 (1936).
In most cases articulating the control concept there has been an inextricable
bond between control and management. The language of the courts, however, seems
broad enough to impose a fiduciary duty on a majority shareholder who does not
participate in the formulation of corporate policy. Yet, a possible distinction might
be raised in an unlikely case in which control merely holds the stock for investment.
10 DeBoy v. Harris, 207 Md. 212, 224, 113 A.2d 903, 909 (1955)
(dictum);
Baker v. Standard Lime & Stone Co., 203 Md. 270, 282-85, 100 A.2d 822, 828-30
(1953) (dictum); Cooperative Milk Service v. Hepner, 198 Md. 104, 114, 81 A.2d
219, 224 (1951) (dictum).
11 See, e.g., Mairs v. Madden, 307 Mass. 378, 30 N.E.2d 242 (1940); Alexandrine Hotel Co. v. Whaling, 313 Mich. 15, 20 N.W.2d 793 (1945).
12 The denomination of the majority shareholder as a fiduciary is not dispositive
of the problem. "To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a
fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations? And what
are the consequences of his deviation from duty?" SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S.
80, 86 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.).
'3 United Milk Prods. Corp. v. Lovell, 75 F.2d 923 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 295
U.S. 751 (1935).
'4 Cf. Kentucky Package Store, Inc. v. Checani, 331 Mass. 125, 117 N.E.2d 139
(1954) ; Hill v. Erwin Mills, Inc., 239 N.C. 437, 80 S.E.2d 358 (1954).
-15Equally unfounded is the contention that the [majority] . . . cannot be

held liable because it was not guilty of fraud or mismanagement. The essential
of the liability to account sought to be enforced in this suit lies not in fraud
or mismanagement, but in the fact that, having become a fiduciary . . . the
[majority] . . . has secured fruits which it has not shared with the minority.
Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 492 (1919).
16 Not only does the majority shareholder owe a duty to the corporation, Lebold
v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675 (1942),
he also must consider the interests of minority shareholders, Zahn v. Transamerica
Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947) ; Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y.
185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919).
17 In Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954), the corporation
was planning to purchase stock of another company to add new lines and strengthen
its competitive position. The plan was nevertheless enjoined because the proposed
financing would have enabled the controlling shareholders to sell their stock to
minority members of the board at a five dollar premium.
18 See, e.g., Levine v. Styleart Press, Inc., 31 Misc. 2d 106, 107, 217 N.Y.S.2d

688, 689 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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Courts have looked critically into transactions which are allegedly
designed to perpetuate or shift control at the expense of other stockholders.
In the leading case of Elliott v. Baker,'9 the court canceled an issuance of
treasury stock, holding that a corporation may not sell stock with intent
to give voting control to a particular party. In a converse situation, the
court in Andersen v. Albert & J. M. Andersen Mfg. Co. held that treasury
stock could not be withheld from the market simply to perpetuate current
control.2 When issuance of stock only incidentally shifts or perpetuates
control, courts are not likely to enjoin.21 In Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage
& Repair Co.,22 the court approved the issuance of previously authorized
shares to one of the defendants who combined them with other shares
purchased from third parties to obtain control of the corporation. The
shares were issued in good faith; the receipts were used to pay creditors
so the corporation could continue in business.
In the present case, the proposed issuance of nonvoting stock would
cause the minority stockholders to lose the benefits of a stock exchange:
improved share marketability,23 increased use of the stock as collateral,.2
published securities prices, and publicity of corporate affairs 2 5 The corporation would also suffer from the issuance, since listing provides goodwill, aids future financing and the sale of securities by stock warrants,
promotes stability through broader public ownership,2 6 and facilitates
mergers and acquisitions through stock payments.27
Hoyt's desire not to relinquish control apparently forced the directors
to recommend the nonvoting stock in the face of its overwhelming disad'9 194 Mass. 518, 80 N.E. 450 (1907).
20 325 Mass. 343, 90 N.E.2d 541 (1950).

In Kahn v. Schiff, 105 F. Supp. 973,
978 (S.D. Ohio 1952), the court enjoined the creation of a new class of voting stock

because "the issuance of stock is for the express purpose of retaining in power the
very persons who authorize the issue, and who are therefore distinctly benefited to
the disadvantage of another and substantial part of the stockholders ....
"
21
Floor v. Johnson, 114 Utah 313, 199 P.2d 547 (1948) ; Luther v. C. J. Luther
Co., 118 Wis. 112, 94 N.W. 69 (1903); see Rohrlich, Suits in Equity by Miwrity

Stockholders as a Means of Corporate Control, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 692, 702-05 (1933).
22253 N.Y. 274, 170 N.E. 917 (1930) ; accord, Runswick v. Floor, 116 Utah 91,
208 P.2d 948 (1949).
23 Moreover, listed stocks sell for higher prices in proportion to their earnings
than unlisted stocks. GUTHaIANN & DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 331

(3d ed. 1955); LEFFLER & FARWELL, TE STOCK MARKET 129 (3d ed. 1963); see

Brief for Complainants, pp. 10-17, instant case.
24 Only listed stocks may be pledged as collateral with a member broker of the

NYSE.
2%5
GUTHmANN & DOUGALL, op. cit. supra note 23, at 327-32; LEFFLER & FARwr.u,
op. cit. supra note 23, at 71-80, 129.
When there has been no breach of fiduciary duty, a court will not let the rules
of the NYSE govern the operations of the corporation. If the state gives corporations
the right to engage in certain activities and the majority of the directors have not

abused this right, minority stockholders cannot base their cause of action on the
NYSE rules. Gaynor v. Buckley, 318 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1963).
26 GUTHMANN & DOUGALL, op. cit. supra note 23, at 330-31; LEFFLER & FARWELL,
op. cit. supra note 23, at 128-29.
27
GUTH ANN & DOUGALL, op. cit. supra note 23, at 331-32.
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vantages.1 The present case presents no danger of a court's substituting its
judgment for that of the directors on corporate policy because the sole
reason for the nonvoting characteristic was revealed in the proxy statement29 and Hoyt admitted that the stock was disadvantageous.30 A
different case might have been presented if the directors had determined
independently that Hoyt's experience and expertise made his control a
valuable asset-more valuable than NYSE listing or other advantages of
voting stock. Faced with such an independent judgment by the directors,
few courts would weigh anew the advantages and disadvantages of a proposed cause of action. Since Hoyt apparently insisted on the plan for his
benefit, however, the present court properly held that the majority shareholder's interest in maintaining control did not justify the detriment to
the corporation and the minority.3 '
The present court also held that both Hoyt and the corporation were
estopped from carrying out the proposed plan by their promise in the
prospectus to apply for NYSE listing. The court needlessly deserted the
2

sAdams and several other directors of Carter would have preferred to have
the new common stock voting rather than non-voting, in order to avoid
delisting by the N.Y.S.E. They tried, unsuccessfully, to convince Hoyt that
he could retain effective working control of Carter with less than 51%5 of
the voting stock. . . . Hoyt has been and is unwilling to relinquish any part
of his control of over 50% of Carter's voting stock. Whatever reasons there
were for the recommendation of Carter's Board of Directors to the stockholders of the creation of additional Common Stock, Hoyt's position in
respect of retention of his majority control was the only reason for the
recommendation that the new Common Stock be non-voting.
Instant case, Findings of Fact Nos. 23-24.
29 The proxy statement admitted that the proposed plan will continue control in
the Hoyt family "which they are unwilling to relinquish or reduce." Instant case,
Finding of Fact No. 27.
3o See Brief for Complainants, p. 6, instant case. The stipulation also discloses
that Carter was not able to interest the Milano Company in a merger because the
latter wanted a tax-free exchange which required voting stock. See INT. REV. CODE
oF 1954, § 368.
31 It has been argued that stockholder approval nullifies any action against
directors for a breach of fiduciary duty. Thurmond v. Paragon Colliery Co., 82 W.
Va. 49, 95 S.E. 816 (1918) ; cf. Haldeman v. Haldeman, 176 Ky. 635, 197 S.W. 376
(1917) (dictum). The argument was rejected in Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d
389 (6th Cir. 1954), the court noting that the influence of the majority in soliciting
proxies and persuading voters, when added to control's initial block of stock, prevented a valid ratification. In the present case, even though the stockholders were
truthfully advised of all relevant matters, approval of the amendment was a foregone
conclusion. Not only did Hoyt and his family vote their 51.38 percent of the shares
in favor of the amendment, see instant case, Finding of Fact No. 33, but so did other
substantial stockholders who were under Hoyt's control or close to him, see instant
case, Finding of Fact No. 31, detailing the votes of the directors and the original
selling shareholders. Even without a large block of stock, the ability to solicit proxies
(management control) usually enables those in power to emerge victorious from
stockholders' meetings. See Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62
CoLu . L. Ray. 433, 438-39 (1962). Stockholder approval of the plan even if the
votes of the majority shareholder are not counted may still not insure a valid ratification. Kahn v. Schiff, 105 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Ohio 1952) (dictum).
That all statutory, charter, and by-law provisions have been observed does not
insure that the fiduciary's duty was not breached. Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125
F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675 (1942) ; Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh
Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919).
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traditional contract analysis in favor of promissory estoppels 2 A statement in a prospectus becomes part of the corporation's offer to sell its stock
and the purchase of that stock supplies the consideration to render promises
in that prospectus enforceable. The court may have resorted to promissory
estoppel on the theory that privity of contract was absent 33-the shares
were not sold directly by the corporation to the public, but title to the
shares was placed in underwriters who then resold them. Viewed realistically, however, there is one large transaction between the corporation
and the public, with the underwriter acting as insurer of the distribution. 34
So viewed, the requisite privity between the corporation and the public
seems present. Recent cases have held that when a vendor makes direct
appeals or statements to the ultimate purchaser through advertising, he may
be liable for a breach of express warranty even if there is a complete absence
of privity.3 5 This exception to the privity rule-if privity did not exist
in the present case-would have bound the corporation to its promise3 6
37
The promise to remain listed was inferred from the prospectus.
The court found that a statement of intent to apply for listing made in a
prospectus carries the strong implication to the financial world that the
listing is certain of being effected and maintained unless adequate reasons
for a subsequent delistment appear. This conclusion seems fully war32 In his discussion of promissory estoppel, Corbin asks, "First, was the action
in reliance actually bargained for by the promisor and given by the promisee in exchange for the promise? If the answer to this is yes, we have a case of true consideration . . . ." 1A CoaRN, CONTRACTS § 205, at 246 (2d ed. 1963). The
corporation did bargain for the purchase of the stock and its promise to apply for
listing was a material inducement to the complainant's purchase. See instant case,
Findings of Fact Nos. 34-35.
33 The court may have been motivated by the somewhat restrictive Maryland
privity doctrines. See, e.g., Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A.2d 316 (1943)
(refused to relax privity requirements even in the case of unwholesome food).
34 In certain cases the underwriters may never have title to the securities. An
underwriting group may simply market the securities for the corporation and guarantee the sale of the entire issue; the underwriters are then working for the corporation and receive commissions for their work. Other underwriting agreements, like
that in the present case, call for the purchase of the securities by the underwriters
with a subsequent resale to the public. See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 197 (rev.
ed. 1946); 2 DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF COPORaTIONS 1082-95 (5th ed. 1953).
No matter what the form of the syndicate, the essential characteristic of the underwriting device remains the same-the placing of the risk of security disposal on the
underwriter.
35 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, 322 F.2d 267, 273 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Randy
Initwear, Inc. v. American Cyanimid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.

S.2d 363 (1962).

Compare United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. City of Waco, 130

Tex. 126, 108 S.W.2d 432 (1937).
36 Corporations have long been bound to warranties made in the sale of their stock.
See Cornish v. Friedman, 94 Ark. 282, 126 S.W. 1079 (1910); 12A FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORaTIONS §§ 5615-16 (1957).
37 There might be more of a problem concerning the effect of implied promises
if the promissory estoppel analysis is used. The defendants argued that the promise
upon which a promisee relies when seeking relief through promissory estoppel must
be an express promise. Although this conclusion seems unwarranted in view of the
trend in contract law not to distinguish between express and implied promises, RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 2 (1932), a court which is hesitant about the use of promissory estoppel might make this distinction. Courts which have considered the question
have held that the doctrine does apply to implied promises. Claverie v. American
Cas. Co., 76 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1935) ; Ziegler v. Ryan, 66 S.D. 491, 285 N.W. 875

(1939).
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ranted3 8 The court properly recognized, however, that listing on the
NYSE may not always be an asset. Adverse credit influence in periods
of recession, increased danger of stock manipulation, excessive interest in
the company's position in the stock market on the part of the company's
managers, and harmful disclosures in reports submitted to the exchange
may all result from the listing of the corporation's stock.3 9 Cognizant of
these considerations, the present court said that Carter could voluntarily
delist if "that action was necessary to achieve a proper corporate purpose." 40

CRIMINAL PROCEDJRE-ADMISSioNS
TIONT

WITHOUT

ARRAIGNMENT

DURING STATE DETENHELD ADMISSIBLE IN A FEDERAL

TRIAL
Defendant was arrested for vagrancy by Oklahoma City Police on
July 15, 1962, and detained without arraignment. In the course of an
interrogation at the police station, he implied that he had committed federal crimes. The next day, a federal investigator making a "routine check"
at the police station was informed of defendant's statements. His questioning of defendant elicited admissions indicating violations of the federal
Transportation of Firearms Act 2 and the Internal Revenue Code. 3 On
July 17, the city police released defendant to the federal officers, who
formally arraigned him. At trial, defendant's incriminating statements were
admitted over the objection that there was an unnecessary delay before he
was taken to a United States Commissioner. The Court of Appeals for
38 The University of Pennsylvania Law Review sent eighteen letters to a random
sample of members of the NYSE to determine whether, according to the known usage
and practice in the financial world, the promise to apply for listing constituted a
promise to remain listed in the absence of a valid corporate purpose for delisting.
Without dissent, the eleven replies indicated that the court had made the proper interpretation of the promise in the present case.
39 GUTHMANN & DouGALL, op. cit. supra note 23, at 332-35. Leffler and Farwell
doubt, however, that there is any serious risk of manipulation today. They contend
that the corners and pools which marked the old market are not present on today's
exchanges. Instead of being a mechanism for manipulation, the exchanges have become
central in the fair determination of prices. LEFFLER & FARWELL, op. cit. supra note 23,
at 75-76.
While the reports required by the NYSE are usually considered to be helpful
to shareholders, they may also force the corporation to reveal information useful to
competitors. It is expected, however, that Congress will eventually subject unlisted
corporations to the same disclosure rules as listed ones. The imposition of such a
requirement is likely to encourage additional corporations to seek listing. See Forbes,
March 1, 1964, p. 26.
40 Instant case at 8; 151 The Daily Record (Baltimore), Sept. 23, 1963, p. 2,
col. 3, 6.

- Under Oklahoma law "the defendant must, in all cases, be taken before the
magistrate without unnecessary delay." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 181 (1937) ; see
Petition of Dare, 370 P.2d 846, 855 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962) (confessions not inadmissible merely because made prior to delayed arraignment; duress must be shown).
252 Stat 1250 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §902(e) (Supp. IV, 1963).
3 INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 5851.
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the Tenth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction. Hollingsworth v.
United States, 321 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1963).
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require that arrested suspects be taken without "unnecessary delay" to a hearing before a Commissioner, who will insure that there is probable cause for the arrest and
inform the suspect of his rights to remain silent, retain counsel, and have a
preliminary examination. 4 Under the Mallory 5 rule, incriminating statements obtained in federal detentions after an "unnecessary delay" 6 are inadmissible in federal trials.
In Anderson v. United States, Tennessee Valley Authority power
lines were dynamited s On his own initiative, the local sheriff arrested
defendants and held them without arraignment for two to six days. During this period, questioning by both the sheriff and federal officers elicited
confessions which were subsequently admitted in defendants' federal trials.
The Supreme Court, observing that the detention was illegal whether measured by state or federal standards, held the confessions inadmissible because obtained through a "working arrangement" between state and federal
officers. 9
The term "working arrangement" was not explicitly defined in Anderson, but the facts of the case support the definition offered by Judge Waterman, dissenting in United States v. Coppola: "such cooperation between
federal and local police as permitted the former to interrogate the latter's
prisoners during their detention by the latter." "I In Coppola, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation informed state police that defendant had committed a state crime. State officials arrested the defendant and detained
him for twenty-nine hours before arraignment. During this time he was
interrogated by federal officials and confessed to a federal crime. In a per
curiam order, with Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting, the Supreme Court
4 FED. R. CRrm. P. 5.

5 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), was the first case to hold

that a confession during an illegal detention must be excluded from a federal trial.
In McNabb the federal agents did not comply with Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 595, 48
Stat. 1008, which required arraignment "immediately" after arrest In 1946 Fm. R.
CRrn. P. 5(a) was passed, requiring that a suspect arrested be taken without "unnecessary delay" before a United States Commissioner. See also FM. R. CRIM. P.
40(b). Thereafter, Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), reaffirmed the

McNabb exclusionary rule.
6 Compare Jones v. United States, 307 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (four hour

delay unnecessary), with Trilling v. United States, 260 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(5-to-4 decision) (three hours not unnecessary). United States v. Mitchell, 322
U.S. 65 (1944), held that an illegal detention following a valid confession does not
render the confession inadmissible. Thus the time relevant for the Mallory rule is
the time between the apprehension and the confession, not apprehension and arraignment, if the confession precedes arraignment. See generally Hogan & Snee, The
McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 GEO. L.J. 1, 17-20 (1958).

U.S. 350 (1943).
This act was a federal offense, 52 Stat. 198 (1938), as amended, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (1958), and a state offense, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4533 (1955).
7318
8

9318 U.S. at 356.
10281 F.2d 340, 348-49 (2d Cir. 1960)

365 U.S. 762 (1961).

(dissenting opinion), aff'd per curiam,
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affirmed the lower court's decision that the defendant's confession was
admissible at his trial in a federal court. Thus, in Coppola the Supreme
Court apparently reconsidered the implications of Anderson and approved
sub silentio the definition of "working arrangement" that had won general
acceptance in the federal courts: a situation in which "state officials are
acting for, and under the direction of, federal agents under circumstances
which fairly warrant the conclusion that the custody is federal in substance." "I Coppola clearly governs the illegal detention issue in the
present case.
As a result of the Coppola gloss on Anderson, if state officers arrest
and detain a suspect on their own initiative, any voluntary admission made
during interrogations by state or federal officers before arraignment may be
used in a subsequent federal trial. The courts reason that statements made
to state officers are admissible because Mallory does not apply to them.'-'
Moreover, statements made to federal officers are admissible because the
federal officers are not responsible for delay before arraignment so long as
the state officers independently detain the suspect for their own purposes.' 3
Mallory apparently only applies when an agency relationship can be established between the federal and state officers in either the arrest or the length
of detention.
Elkins v. United States,'4 decided one year before Coppola, eliminated
a similar "silver platter" doctrine in the search and seizure area by holding
that evidence seized by a state officer would be inadmissible in a federal
trial if the seizure were unreasonable by federal standards. Elkins was
designed to deter federal and state officers from cooperating to undermine
the rule of Weeks v. United States,'5 which excludes from the federal
courts all evidence unconstitutionally seized by federal officers. Elkins is
distinguishable from Coppola and the present case because in the Elkins
situation state officers were violating the federal constitution '6 whereas
in the latter they are at most violating a state law. 17 Even though the
requirement of arraignment without "unnecessary delay" helps prevent
11 Carpenter v. United States, 264 F.2d 565, 571 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 936 (1959); see United States v. Coppola, 281 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'd
per curiam, 365 U.S. 762 (1961); Stephenson v. United States, 257 F.2d 175 (6th
Cir. 1958); Papworth v. United States, 256 F2d 125 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 854 (1958) ; Home v. United States, 246 F.2d 83 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 878 (1957); White v. United States, 200 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 999 (1953). But see Runnels v. United States, 138 F.2d 346 (9th Cir.
1943); United States v. Tupper, 168 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
2 See, e.g., Swift v. United States, 314 F2d 860 (10th Cir. 1963).
'3 Papworth v. United States, 256 F.2d 125, 128 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 854 (1958).
14 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
15 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
16 See 364 U.S. at 213; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) (dictum).
17 The state law was being violated in Coppola, see United States v. Coppola,
281 F.2d 340, 341 n.1 (2d Cir. 1960) (dictum), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 762 (1961),
and in the present case, see note 1 supra.
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coerced confessions 18 and arrests without probable cause, 19 neither this requirement nor the Mallory exclusionary rule has heretofore been regarded
as constitutionally required.20 Therefore, evidence acquired in state deten21
tions illegal by federal standards is not obtained unconstitutionally.
The Anderson-Coppola rule does not effectively prevent cooperation
between state and federal officers to circumvent Mallory. A "working
arrangement" is difficult to prove, especially since officers who intentionally
22
Federal
try to circumvent a federal rule might also perjure themselves.
officers need not actually initiate an arrest to circumvent Mallory. Close
cooperation might easily keep state officers informed about federal suspects,
and individuals wanted by both authorities could be arrested by state
officers. Informed of the arrest, federal officers could rely on the state
officers to interrogate thoroughly, then make a "routine check," 2 study
the interrogation of the suspect, and, if necessary, either request additional
interrogation by state officers or interrogate the suspect themselves. Because of the difficulties in proving secret or unspoken agreements between
state and federal officers,2 4 even the broad construction of Anderson's
"working arrangement" 2 could not prevent state and federal cooperation
to circumvent Mallory, since federal officers could avoid personally interrogating the suspect, but instead advise state officers about the line of questioning they wish pursued. The defendant might never know federal
officers were involved.
Cases decided subsequent to Coppola indicate that the "silver platter"
doctrine in the illegal detentions area should be discarded entirely. In the
thirty-five months since Coppola there are eight reported cases in which
admissions concerning federal crimes were made by prisoners in state de18 The rule deters the practice of trying to coerce confessions during long delays
behind closed doors by making such confessions inadmissible. In addition, the rule
eliminates the difficult problem of litigating what goes on behind the closed doors.
See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter,
3.); Ashcroft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 152-53 (1944) (dictum).
19 Mallory reduces the number of illegal arrests because an officer is less likely
to arrest an offender without probable cause when shortly after the arrest he is
required to bring the offender before a magistrate and show probable cause there.
See Hogan & Snee, .upra note 6, at 22-23.
20 See, e.g., Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
2
1Evidence obtained in these detentions will not contaminate the federal courts
to the same extent as evidence unreasonably seized by state officers. While the undesirability of contaminating a federal court was emphasized by Justices Holmes and
Brandeis, see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ; id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting), the main purpose of an exclusionary
rule should not be to keep tainted material out of the courts but to deter improper
police conduct, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (dictum); Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (dictum) ; Blakey, The Rule of Announceinent and Unlazful Entry: Miller v. United States and Ker v. California, 112 U. PA.
L. Rxv. 499, 552 (1964).
(opinion of Frank22 Cf. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 574 (1961)
furter, J.). Compare Ashcroft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 149-53 (1944) (dictum).
23The present case may be an example. See instant case at 345.
24 Cf. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 573-74 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).

25 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
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tention before any arraignment 2 6 For example, in Sullivan v. United
States,27 defendant was arrested by state officers who apparently suspected
him of a state crime. After confessing to a federal crime during a state
detention of uncertain length, defendant entered a guilty plea to the federal
offense. The court held that the Anderson rule invalidated neither the
guilty plea nor the confession upon which it was based.as In Swift v. United
9
state officers arrested defendant after they had reason to know he
States,2
had committed a federal offense. Defendant was apparently detained in
state custody for a period "unnecessary" under the federal standards, but
30
his statements made during that period were admitted against him.
31
In Evans v. United States, defendant's statements, made after a period
in state custody which was "unnecessary" under the Federal Rules, were
admitted against him even though state officers had arrested defendant at
the express request of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
32
Although the Anderson-Coppola rule aids federal law enforcement,

Mallory assumes that prolonged detentions prior to arraignment are not
33
Since the Mallory rule is designed
necessary in federal law enforcement.
to protect individual rights, it is appropriate for the federal courts to
34
Killough v. United States,35 in
preserve the integrity of that decision
which the District of Columbia Circuit held that a confession obtained in
violation of Mallory and reaffirmed after arraignment but before defend36
ant has consulted with counsel must be excluded from a federal trial,
26 Evans v. United States, 325 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1963); Hutchins v. United
States, 322 F.2d 649 (10th Cir. 1963) (per curiam) ; instant case; Sullivan v. United
States, 315 F.2d 304 (10th Cir. 1963) ; Swift v. United States, 314 F.2d 860 (10th
Cir. 1963); Davidson v. United States, 312 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1963); Hayes v.
United States, 296 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 867 (1962) ; Reed
v. United States, 291 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961). See also Jones v. United States,
No. 17688, D.C. Cir., Feb. 6, 1964 (statements given in federal detention immediately
following a state detention but before any arraignment); United States v. Long,
323 F.2d 468 (6th Cir. 1963) ; Cram v. United States, 316 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1963) ;
United States v. Sailer, 309 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 835
(1963); United States v. Connell, 213 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1963) (statements
given after state arraignment, but while in state custody and before federal arraignment).
27 315 F.2d 304 (10th Cir. 1963).
2
8Id. at 305. But cf. Reed v. United States, 291 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961).
29 314 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1963).
30
Accord, Davidson v. United States, 312 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1963) ; see Hayes
v. United States, 296 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1961) (same except unclear whether or
not the state detention was illegal by federal standards). But see Reed v. United
States, 291 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961) (statement made to federal officer during state
detention may violate Anderson; guilty plea invalidated because not voluntary).
31325 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1963).
32 See instant case at 352.
3 No part of the criminal law of any state or of the federal government provides for a period of questioning of a suspect by police officers after his arrest. See
Hogan & Snee, supra note 6, at 23-24. However, UNIFORM ARREST Acr § 2 provides
for a two hour "detention" period preceding a technical arrest. The constitutionality
of the provision has not yet been tested.
34 Cf. Griffin v. United States, 336 U.S. 704, 714 (1949) (dictum).
35 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
36 The federal officer admitted that he was trying to circumvent Mallory. See
id. at 242.
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closed one avenue by which Mallory can be circumvented.37 A rule which
excludes from federal courts admissions obtained in state detentions which
would violate federal standards appears necessary to block off a much wider
avenue.

FEDERAL COURTS-CoNvEYANCE TO NONRESIDENT RELATiVE
PRIOR To LAND CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS GAINS FEDERAL DIVER-

siTY JURISDICTION DESPITE ASSIGNEE'S PROMISE

To PAY LITIGA-

TION PROCEEDS TO ASSIGNORS

A family-owned Alabama corporation transferred land to its several
shareholders as tenants in common. All but one of the shareholders resided in Alabama. The share of the property received by each shareholder
was in proportion to his ownership in the corporation. About three months
later, the city council passed a resolution to condemn part of the land
transferred. However, three days before the city instituted suit in a state
court,1 the resident defendants assigned for one dollar consideration their
interest in the land to the nonresident defendant for the express purpose
of creating diversity jurisdiction. The defendants agreed that the assignee
would divide the entire condemnation award among the resident defendants
according to their former interest in the property. After the nonresident
defendant removed the case to a federal district court by alleging diversity
jurisdiction,2 the city moved for remand 3 to the state court by alleging
that the jurisdiction had been collusively obtained. 4 The district court
assumed jurisdiction, however, holding that one dollar consideration was
sufficient to support the transfer of the land under Alabama law and that
the motive for the assignment was irrelevant to federal diversity jurisdiction. 5 City of Eufaula v. Pappas, 213 F. Supp. 749 (M.D. Ala. 1963).
37

Cf. Reed v. United States, 291 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961).

1 Brief for Plaintiff, p. 2, instant case.
228 U.S.C. § 1441 (1958).
3 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1958) requires that a federal court to which a suit has
been removed must remand the suit to the state court if at any time before final
judgment it appears that the suit was not removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1958).
4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1958).
6The city raised another objection to diversity jurisdiction. It alleged that
easements and an undefined portion of the condemned land, which were owned by
other residents, were inseparable from the interests of the defendants and would
preclude removal based on diversity jurisdiction. The judge, however, ruled that
the cause of action stated against the removing defendant was "separate and distinct"
from those stated against the other interests. Instant case at 752. The test applied
by the judge is no longer in effect. The present removal statute requires a finding
that the cause of action stated against the removing party be "separate and independent" from those stated against the nonremovable interests. 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(c) (1958), American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951). See generally
1A MooRE, FDERAI. PRACricE 1 0.162, 0.163 (2d ed. 1961).
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Had the transfer among the defendants not occurred, none of them
would have had any basis for obtaining diversity jurisdiction.6 Since
diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity of citizenship between all
defendants and all plaintiffs,7 the resident defendants could not have
removed the case to a federal court. The nonresident defendant alone could
not have removed for two reasons. The value of her interest in the land
was probably insufficient to meet the minimum value in controversy necessary to invoke diversity jurisdiction.8 In addition, section 1441(c) of the
Judicial Code authorizes removal of cases involving more than one defendant from state courts only if the plaintiff's cause of action against the
removing defendant would be removable if sued upon alone and if it is
"separate and independent" from the cause of action against other defendants with nonremovable interests. 9 Since the nonresident defendant owned
an undivided interest in the land, and other undivided interests were owned
by residents, removal would be precluded.10
Section 1359 prohibits federal courts from assuming diversity jurisdiction when "any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly
or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court." :
Since the nonresident defendant owned an interest in the land before the
transfer, the words "made or joined" do not literally apply to the present
case. The transfer did not "join" the nonresident as a party since she already was one; she was "made" a party only to the extent that the transfer
enabled her to seek federal removal jurisdiction based on diversity of
citizenship.
In analogous cases concerning transfers by resident parties to nonresidents who did not previously own an interest in the transferred property,
courts have developed certain criteria to determine the effect of the transfer
on jurisdiction. Section 1359 has been construed to deny jurisdiction
when the resident retained a significant interest in the outcome of the
6 The party invoking federal diversity jurisdiction must allege, and if challenged
must prove, the existence of diversity jurisdiction. E.g., McNutt v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936); Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73 (10th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963); Steinberg v. Toro, 95 F. Supp. 791 (D.P.R.
1951).
7E.g., Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Fin. Co., 264 U.S. 182 (1924); see
American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
8 Three months before the present action, the 100 acres, which included the condemned land, was valued at $60,000 for the purposes of the state transfer tax. An
eight-acre portion of the condemned tract, included in the condemnation order, was
optioned to another party for $16,000. Brief for Plaintiff, p. 2. These figures indicate that the nonresident's one-twelfth interest in the 35.9 acres condemned probably
was not worth the $10,000 required for diversity. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 (1958).
9 American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951) ; 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1958).
10 See, e.g., Bellaire v.' Baltimore & O.R.R., 146 U.S. 117 (1892); Torrence v.
Shedd, 144 U.S. 527 (1892); Rosen v. Rozan, 179 F. Supp. 829 (D. Mont 1960).
Although the first two cases were decided before 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) was enacted,
their authority is unimpaired because § 1441(c) reduced the scope of removal jurisdiction. See American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, supra note 9.
1128 U.S.C. § 1359 (1958).
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litigation.'- Evidence of control over the property by the assignor after
its assignment is a strong indication that he has retained such a significant
interest. 13 Not only did the present assignors retain a significant interest
in the outcome of the litigation, but some testimony,' 4 as well as the family
relationship between the assignors and assignee, indicates that the assignee
may not have been free to dispose of the property or otherwise treat it as
her own rather than defend the suit.
Despite these factors, the present court assumed jurisdiction in part
because nominal consideration supported the transfer to the nonresident. 15
12

E.g., Farmington v. Pillsbury, 114 U.S. 138 (1885); Barney v. Baltimore
City, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 280 (1867); Hartmann Coal Mining Co. v. Hoke, 157 F.
Supp. 313 (E.D. Pa. 1957); Steinberg v. Toro, 95 F. Supp. 791 (D.P.R. 1951); see
Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327 (1895); Tower Realty Co. v.
City of E. Detroit, 185 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1950) (semble) ; Peterson v. Sucro, 93
F.2d 878 (4th Cir. 1938) ; cf. Cross v. Allen, 141 U.S. 528 (1891).
Thus, if the legal title in bonds is assigned to a nonresident for the purpose of
collection by suit in a federal court and equitable title is retained by the assignor,
jurisdiction will be denied when the assignee attempts to sue the resident debtor in
a federal court. E.g., Woodside v. Beckham, 216 U.S. 117 (1910) ; Waite v. Santa
Cruz, 184 U.S. 302 (1902); Bernards Township v. Stebbins, 109 U.S. 341 (1883);
Birkins v. Seaboard Serv., 96 F. Supp. 245 (D.N.J. 1950); see Barney v. Baltimore
City, supra.
If the purchase price of the property depends on the outcome of the anticipated
litigation, jurisdiction will also be denied. Cf. Little v. Giles, 118 U.S. 596, 603-07
(1886) ; Farmington v. Pillsbury, supra. The same result obtains when the assignee
promises to reconvey the property after the owners' rights have been established in a
federal court. See Miller & Lux, Inc. v. East Side Canal & Irr. Co., 211 U.S. 293
(1908); Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, supra; Barney v. Baltimore City, supra.
Jurisdiction has also been denied when the legal relationship between the parties
permitted the assignor to acquire the benefits of the litigation without payment of
consideration, although the terms of the assignment indicated that full legal and
equitable title passed to the assignee. This situation occurs when a resident corporation assigns property to a nonresident subsidiary for the purpose of creating diversity
jurisdiction. Compare Miller & Lux, Inc. v. East Side Canal & Irr. Co., stpra, with
Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518 (1928) (assumed jurisdiction because the parent had dissolved), and
Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963)
(transfer to sole stockholder).
Diversity jurisdiction will also be denied when the evidence shows that the
asserted assignment was a sham or when the assignee never intended to pay the
stated consideration or take title to the property. E.g., Southern Realty Inv. Co. v.
Walker, 211 U.S. 603 (1909) ; Lake County Comm'rs v. Dudley, 173 U.S. 243 (1899);
Steinberg v. Toro, mpra.
13 See, e.g., Miller & Lux, Inc. v. East Side Canal & Irr. Co., .rupra note 12;
Farmington v. Pillsbury, mopra note 12; Steinberg v. Toro, supra note 12; Ikeler v.
Detroit Trust Co., 39 F. Supp. 371 (E.D. Mich. 1941).
1
4 On direct examination of Gregory Pappas, one of the resident assignors, the
following testimony indicates that the residents may not have yielded all control over
the property with the transfer:
Q. Is she [nonresident assignee] free to convey the property now if she
wanted to?
A. No.
her? Q. Well, I mean is the record title in-is the title to the property in
A. Yes, sir.
Record, p. 4.
15 The court held that, under Alabama law, the recitation of $1.00 nominal consideration is sufficient to transfer the legal as well as the equitable title to the property.
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Although the absence of valuable consideration has never been a sufficient
ground for denial of diversity jurisdiction, 6 its presence tends to establish
a bona fide transfer and divestment of interest and control in the property
by the resident assignor. 17 Its absence in the present case, however, adds
to the apparent collusion shown by the agreement to distribute the litigation proceeds.
The present court also cited Cross v. Allen,"' in which a resident
partnership conveyed land to a nonresident partner so that suit could be
brought in a federal court. Upholding diversity jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court emphasized that the motive behind the transfer was unimportant 19
because the resident partnership had received full consideration for the land
and had relinquished its interest in the property.20 Since both these factors
are absent in the present case, it seems apparent that Cross v. Allen is
not authority for upholding jurisdiction; on the contrary, it suggests that
jurisdiction should have been denied. Moreover, other courts have suggested that motive is a relevant consideration when the transferor retains
21
a significant interest in the property.
The present holding also renders ineffective section 1441(c) by permitting the resident defendant to assign his interest to the nonresident defendant, thus allowing the nonresident defendant to remove to a federal
court a claim not "separate and independent" from that against the resident
Crosby v. Baldwin County, 227 Ala. 122, 148 So. 814 (1933) ; Stewart v. Stewart,
171 Ala. 485, 54 So. 604 (1911). The grantor cannot recover the land even if the
stated consideration was never paid provided there is neither fraud nor duress. Wilfe
v. Waller, 261 Ala. 436, 74 So. 2d 451 (1954) ; Stewart v. Stewart, supra.
16 Diversity jurisdiction was upheld when a resident assigned his interest in bonds

issued by his state to a resident of another state as a gift so that the assignee could

use the federal courts to establish the validity of the assigned bonds, as well as similar
bonds held by the assignor. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904) ;

see Peterson v. Sucro, 93 F.2d 878 (4th Cir. 1938) ; Woodside v. Ciceroni, 93 Fed. 1
(9th Cir. 1899) ; Benedict v. Seiberling, 17 F.2d 841 (N.D. Ohio 1927).
'7 See Barney v. Baltimore City, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 280 (1867); Bradbury v.

Dennis, 310 F.2d 73 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963); Board of
Educ. v. James, 49 F.2d 91 (10th Cir. 1931) ; O'Neil v. Wolcott Mining Co., 174 F.2d
527 (8th Cir. 1909); Hartmann Coal Mining Co. v. Hoke, 157 F. Supp. 313 (E.D.
Pa. 1957).
18141 U.S. 528 (1891).
'9 Accord, e.g., Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928); Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73
(10th2 Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963).
0 The present court quoted the following passage from Cross v. Allen, 141 U.S.
528, 533 (1891):
The transfer of the notes and mortgages having been made for a valuable
consideration, and the pecuniary interest of the transferrer in the subject
matter of the transfer having thereby terminated, it makes no difference that
by such transaction the transferee acquired the advantage of suing in the
Federal Court. This suit, so far as the record shows, is for the sole and exclusive benefit of the complainant [nonresident].
Instant case at 751. (Emphasis added.)
21 See Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928) (dictum) ; Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73 (10th
Cir. 1962) (dictum), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963); Tower Realty Co. v. City
of E. Detroit, 185 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1950).
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defendant. 22 It thus seems clear that section 1359 should deny jurisdiction
in the present case even though the transferee owned an interest in the
property prior to the transfer.
The statutory history of section 1359 indicates that this fact should not
affect the outcome. The section arose out of the 1948 revision of the
Judicial Code to replace two preexisting statutes. One, the assignee clause,
provided that:
No district court shall have cognizance of any suit (except
upon foreign bills of exchange) to recover upon any promissory
note or other chose in action in favor of any assignee, or of any
subsequent holder if such instrument be payable to bearer and be
not made by any corporation, unless such suit might have been
prosecuted in such court to recover on said note or other chose
in action if no assignment had been made.2 3
This clause was designed to prevent the manufacture of diversity
jurisdiction by assignment.2 4 The courts, however, interpreted the phrase
"promissory note or other chose in action" as not applicable to obligations
implied in law, assignments by operation of law, and assignments of real
property interests as in the present case; 25 the statute itself is explicitly
inapplicable to corporate bearer paper and foreign bills of exchange. These
exceptions, which weakened the prophylactic effect of the section, and its
inclusion of bona fide purchasers for value of nonexcepted obligations, induced the revisers to drop the assignee clause and replace it with section
1359.26 Thus, the history behind the revised section suggests that it was
designed to expand the exclusionary effect of the assignee clause to cover
assignments to which it was previously inapplicable, such as land transfers,
which do not involve a bona fide purchaser for value. Significantly, there
is no bona fide purchaser for value in the present case.2'
The other statute previously governing denial of jurisdiction was section 80 of the 1940 Judicial Code which required district courts to deny
jurisdiction of "such suit [which] does not really and substantially involve
a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said district
court, or . . . [if] the parties to said suit have been improperly or col-

lusively made or joined, either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose
.,28
of creating a case cognizable or removable under this chapter ..
22See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
23
Act of May 3, 1911, ch. 231, §24(1), 36 Stat. 1091.
24 See Sowell v. Federal Reserve Bank, 268 U.S. 449, 453-58 (1925); Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Johnson, 54 F.2d 367 (D. Md. 1931); H.R. REP.
No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A126 (1947) [hereinafter referred to as H.R. REP.
No. 308].
25
Brovn v. Fletcher, 235 U.S. 589 (1915); Peterson v. Sucro, 93 F.2d 878
(4th Cir. 1938); H.R. REP. No. 308, at A126.
26 Ibid.
27See MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 0.03(24) (1949);
H.R. REP. No. 308, at A125-26.
28 Act of May 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 37, 36 Stat. 1098.
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The revisers decided to eliminate the first part of section 80, involving
dismissal of cases not properly within the court's jurisdiction, as unnecessary because "any court will dismiss a case not within its jurisdiction
,9 They also decided that the second part of section 80 dealing
)
....
with assignments was sufficient to preclude jurisdiction when "the assign30
ment is improperly or collusively made to invoke [federal] jurisdiction."
Therefore, they reenacted the second part of section 80 in substantially
the same language and did not reenact any other portions of the other two
sections dealing with the denial of diversity jurisdiction.
This history indicates that section 1359 should defeat jurisdiction in
the present case. The court could have held that, although the nonresident
had previously been a party, she was "improperly or collusively made" the
sole party by the transfer for the express purpose of enabling her to seek
removal of the case to federal court. This construction is supported by the
statutory history.
In the alternative, the court could have taken the revisers literally and
dismissed the suit as not really and substantially involving a dispute or
controversy properly within the jurisdiction of a federal court since the
suit was, in reality, that of the resident parties who will receive payments
directly based on an award made in a federal court.

TAXATION-ComISsiONER REFuSEs To REEVoKE DICTUm DENYING DEDUCTION FOR CHARITABLE REMAINDERS WHENEVER PAYMENT
OF iUTUAL FUND CAPITAL GAIN DISTRIBUTIONS TO LIFE TENANT

Is POSSIBLE
When a trust provides for income to a noncharitable life tenant and
remainder to charity, the value of the remainder at the time of the trust's
inception is generally deductible for federal income, estate, and gift tax
purposes.1 Revenue Ruling 60-385 2 held that the deduction would be
allowed when the instrument creating such a trust provides "that the corpus
may be invested in stock of regulated investment companies, and that
[capital gain] dividends [therefrom]

. . . be treated as corpus ....

"

3

Reversing his previous position, however, the Commissioner stated in
dictum that "if the trust instrument provides that [capital gain] dividends
29 H.R. RE.

No. 308, at A125.

so Id. at A126.
1 INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 170, 2055, 2522; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170-1(d)

(income tax), 20.2055-2(a) (1958) (estate tax), 25.2522(a)-2(a) (1958)

(1958)

(gift tax) ;

see Rudick & Gray, Bounty Twice Blessed: Tax Consequences of Gifts of Property
to or in Trust for Charity, 16 TAX L. REv. 273 (1961).
21960-2 CuM. BuLL. 77 [hereinafter referred to as present ruling].
3
Rev. Rul. 55-620, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 56, held that "the present worth of the
the [capital gain]
remainder interest . . . is deductible . . . irrespective oftowhether
the corpus . ...
dividends . . . are distributed as income . . . or added
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. . . shall (or, in the trustee's discretion, may) be treated as income
. . . or if the instrument could be so construed . . . ." a deduction

would be denied. 4 On behalf of the Corporate Fiduciaries Association of
Philadelphia, counsel requested revocation of the ruling, contending that
mutual fund capital gain distributions are clearly income and that payment
of them to the life tenant does not render the value of the remainder uncertain. 5 The Commissioner conceded that the nature of capital gain
dividends was doubtful, but denied the request, stating that revocation
"would have to be based on a clear finding that . . . [they] are income

and not principal." PrivateLetter Ruling From Internal Revenue Service
to Kenneth W. Gemnnill, Oct. 25, 1963.6
The Regulations provide that a deduction for a charitable remainder
may be taken only insofar as the charitable interest is "presently ascertainable." 7 Litigation concerning this requirement has been confined largely
to cases in which the trust instrument provided that corpus might, under
certain circumstances, be invaded for the benefit of the life tenant.8 Since,
in such cases, the instrument itself evidences an intent, or at least a willingness, that the charitable interest be diminished or defeated, the burden of
overcoming this evidence properly has been placed on the taxpayer.9
Unless the possibility of invasion "is so remote as to be negligible," 10 the
charitable deduction will be denied or reduced by the extent to which the
power to invade may be exercised."1 However, a prompt and irrevocable
disclaimer by the beneficiary of a power to invade will preserve at least
4 Present ruling (dictum).

5 Memorandum on Behalf of Corporate Fiduciaries Association of Philadelphia
From Kenneth W. Gemmill & George Craven to Internal Revenue Service, January
25, 1963, on file in the Biddle Law Library [hereinafter referred to as memorandum].
6
On file in the Biddle Law Library [hereinafter referred to as letter].
7 (a) Remainders and similar interests. If a trust is created . . . for both
a charitable and a private purpose, deduction may be taken of the value of
the charitable beneficial interest, only insofar as that interest is presently
ascertainable, and hence severable from the noncharitable interest. The
present value of a remainder . . . is to be determined in accordance with

the rules stated in § 20.2031-7.
Treas. Reg. §20.2055-2(a) (1958) (estate tax). The Gift Tax Regulations contain
a similar provision. Treas. Reg. §25-2522(a)-2(a) (1958). The Income Tax Regulations merely provide that a "remainder interest shall be valued according to the
tables8 [of §20.2031-7] . . . ." Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1(d) (1958).
See Rev. Rul. 54-285, 1954-2 Cum. BuLL. 302. For the leading cases in the
area compare Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929) (deduction
allowed), with Merchants Nat1 Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256 (1943) (deduction denied). See generally 2 BEVERIDGE, FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION §§ 15.08, 15.09
(1956), and cases cited therein. An analogous but distinguishable problem arises
when the charitable remainder interest is ascertainable in amount, but conditional.
See Commissioner N%Sternberger's Estate, 348 U.S. 187 (1955); 2 BnV,mGEn, op.
cit. supra § 15.07.
) Even a remote possibility that the corpus can be invaded without limitation has
destroyed the deduction. Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335
U.S. 595 (1949). The standard has been criticized as being too severe. See Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, supra note 8, at 263 (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, supra at 600 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
'oTreas. Reg. §§20.2055-2(b), 25.2522(a)-2(b) (1958).
11 Ibid.
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the estate tax deduction. 12 The present ruling attaches to the mere possibility of payment of mutual fund capital gain dividends to the life tenant
the identical consequences that flow from an unlimited power to invade the
corpus.
Assuming arguendo that such payments constitute a diversion of the
trust corpus, delineation of the proper scope of the present ruling presents
a serious problem. 3 It clearly applies to trusts requiring or expressly permitting investment in mutual fund shares, and does not apply when the
instrument excludes mutual funds as permissible investments. But when
the instrument makes no reference to mutual funds, the trust would seem
to be one in which "the corpus may be invested in stock of regulated investment companies," 14 unless the applicable state law excludes them from
the list of permissible trust investments. 15 Thus, except in the relatively
few states requiring addition of mutual fund capital gain dividends to
corpus, 16 the charitable deduction would be denied. This seems a harsh
penalty for the mere omission of provisions which might appear irrelevant
to the draftsman when mutual fund investments were not contemplated.
On the other hand, if the ruling is not applied to trusts in which mutual
funds are unmentioned, the charitable deduction could be obtained despite
the fact that capital gain distributions from subsequently acquired mutual
fund shares might be paid to the life tenant. The trustee's agreement either
to refrain from purchasing mutual fund shares or to allocate capital gain
distributions to corpus, or the life tenant's disclaimer of any interest in such
distributions, would operate as a "complete termination of a power to consume." 17 Therefore, the Commissioner could achieve uniform results 18
without undue harshness by applying the ruling only to trusts contemplating
mutual fund investments and, in other cases, by requiring such an agreement or disclaimer as a condition of deductibility."
12 Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(c) (1) (1958). The Income Tax and Gift Tax Regulations contain no analogous provisions.
13Although the present ruling was prospective in effect, applying only to trusts
taking effect after January 1, 1961, it necessitates review of all wills of living testators
creating trusts with charitable remainders. Memorandum, p. 3.
14 Present ruling.
15 BOGERT, TRTUSTS § 105, at 280 (4th ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as BOGaRT],
notes a recent tendency to include mutual funds in statutory lists as valid trust investments.
16 In the absence of contrary directions, four states require allocation to corpus.
FLA. STAT. ANN. §690.06(1) (Supp. 1962); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 160, §18
(Supp. 1963) ; N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAw § 17-a(7) (effective June 1, 1964) ; Wis. STAT.
ANN. §231.40(5)(a) (Supp. 1963).
One state has reached this result by judicial
decision. Tait v. Peck, 194 N.E.2d 707 (Mass. 1963).
17 Cf. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(c) (2) (1958).
18 The Commissioner shows concern for uniformity when he says, "since State
rules differ, we have the difficult task of deciding what are the demands made on us
in administering the tax law with uniformity, and to what extent we can justify
allowing equal deductions for unequal rights." Letter, p. 3.
11The Commissioner suggests the "possible publication of a clarifying ruling
at some fiture date, which may also cover areas to which Revenue Ruling 60-385 is
not to be applied." Letter, p. 4. (Emphasis added.)
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The basic question remains as to whether a trust which holds or contemplates holding mutual fund shares and requires 20 allocation of capital
gain dividends to the life tenant should, within the framework of the Regulations, be denied a deduction. The Commissioner did not rule that such
dividends clearly were capital, but based disallowance of the deduction on
the proposition that they are not clearly income. The search for a clear
definition is inevitably doomed to failure.21 State courts which have considered the question have almost uniformly required that mutual fund
23
capital gain dividends be paid to the income beneficiary; 22 a few statutes
and the revised Uniform Principal and Income Act 24 provide that they be
added to corpus. These decisions and statutes, however, decide only to
whom the distributions shall be paid in the absence of contrary directions.
When expressed, the settlor's intent controls. 25 As a practical matter, the
intent of the settlor of a charitable remainder trust is, in most cases, to
provide the life tenant, usually himself or a member of his family, with the
maximum income consistent with obtaining a tax deduction for the contribution or bequest.2 6 To implement that intent, he would undoubtedly
choose, or desire that the trustee choose, investments offering a generous
return in preference to those which sacrifice current income for maximum
20 The case in which the instrument requires allocation to the life tenant is obviously the strongest The instrument may direct the trustee to use his discretion,
or it may say nothing, in which event the trustee may be permitted or required to
allocate such dividends to the life tenant under the governing state law. The case
in which the settlor leaves the trustee no alternative may be distinguishable. See note
55 infra and accompanying text.
21
For a lively debate on the subject by two authorities in the field of trust law
see Shattuck, Capital Gain Distributions-Principalor Income?, 88 TRUSTS & ESTATES
160 (1949) ; Young, A Dissent on Capital Gain Distributions,88 TRUSTS & ESTATES
280 (1949) ; Shattuck, Further Comment on Capital Gait Distributions,88 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 429 (1949) ; Young, More About Capital Gains, 88 TRUSTS & ESTATES 467
(1949). Shattuck takes the position that a mutual fund share represents an undivided
interest in a pool of assets and that the gain retains the character it would have if
the stockholder owned the underlying asset himself. Young maintains that it is a
share in a corporation devoted to buying and selling securities at a profit and that
the distribution is merely passing the profit on to the shareholder. Basically, all
arguments proceed from one of these two assumptions.
22
Rosenburg v. Lombardi, 222 Md. 346, 160 A.2d 601 (1960) (profits from sale
of assets in ordinary course of business) ; In re Trust of Gardner, 123 N.W.2d 69
(Minn. 1963) (option to receive either cash or stock) ; Coates v. Coates, 304 S.W.2d
874 (Mo. 1957) ("subjective" approach, see note 30 infra and accompanying text) ;
Briel v. Mody, 77 N.J. Super. 306, 186 A.2d 314 (Eq. 1962) (cash dividends) ; Lovett
Estate (No. 2), 78 Pa. D. & C. 21 (Orphans' Ct. Luzerne County 1951) ("true
income dividends"). Contra, Tait v. Peck, 194 N.E.2d 707 (Mass. 1963) (adopting
view of Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act, note 24 infra). A number of
New York lower court decisions holding capital gain dividends to be income have
been reversed by statute. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAw § 17-a(7) (effective June 1, 1964).
23 See statutes cited note 16 mpra.
24
REVISED UNIFORM PINCn'AL AND INcOME AT § 6(c) [hereinafter cited as

UNxiFoa
2

ACT].

5UNiFoRm ACT § 2(a) (1); BOGERT § 109; 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 236.15 (2d ed.

1956).2

6 While it might be assumed that the settlor intended increased benefits for the
charity, it would be unrealistic to imply an intention to benefit the Government. Thus,
if the income were greater than the anticipated needs of the life tenant, additional
charitable contributions could be made out of that income and additional tax deductions realized therefrom.
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27
A reasonable discresafety or the opportunity for capital enhancement.
tion in the choice of investments has not heretofore been equated with a
permission to invade the corpus.28
Mutual fund shareholders generally may elect to accept capital gain
29
In the subjective
distributions in either cash or additional fund shares.
view of the investor, an election to take cash is not a decision to deplete his
capital, but rather a choice of an investment offering an ample current
return in preference to one affording more modest income and planned
capital enhancement. 30 It is not significantly different from selecting a
corporate stock yielding five percent rather than the stock of another corporation, yielding less than three percent, with a policy of financing growth
31
While the immediate and
through planned reinvestment of earnings.
27 For an excellent summary of current views on trust investments see Jennett,
Concepts of Trust Investments, 94 TRUSTS & ESTATES 843 (1955).
Changing
2
8A charitable remainder has been held to be presently ascertainable and, hence,
deductible even when the trust investments could be chosen by the life tenant who
presumably would exercise his power to maximize current income, the court implying
a duty to protect the integrity of the principal. "Nothing . . . discloses an uncertainty except the possibility that the securities could not survive . . . the exercise
. . . [of the life tenant's] reasonable discretion in changing investments. Such a
possibility of disappearance of the corpus is too remote to defeat the deduction."
Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 337, 343 (1942), rev'd on other grounds
mb nom. Worcester County Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 578 (1st Cir. 1943).
It is doubtful that the Commissioner would acquiesce in such a decision today.
The Regulations deny deduction of a charitable income interest when the trust assets
consist of stock in a corporation the fiscal policies of which are controlled by private
remaindermen. Treas. Reg. §§20.2055-2(b), 25.2522(a)-2(b) (1958). By analogy,
it would seem reasonable to deny deduction of a charitable remainder interest when
the trust held stock in a corporation controlled by the private income beneficiary.
An extension of this rationale would indicate that unfettered control of investment
policy by the life tenant is inconsistent with his fiduciary responsibility to the remainderman.
29 The great popularity of mutual fund shares-assets increased from $2.5 billion
in 1941 to $29 billion in 1961, 27 SEC ANN. REP. (1960-1961)-is generally attributed
to the advantages of diversification and professional management. Another significant
appeal is the flexible distribution arrangement which enables an investor to "tailor"
his fund investment to his personal objectives. A typical fund offers three options:
(1) all distributions in cash, (2) income dividends in cash and capital gain distributions in stock, and (3) all distributions in stock. Wellington Fund, Prospectus,
April 1, 1963 (Supp. Oct. 21, 1963), p. 2.
30 "[I]nvestors in such trusts count on [capital gain] distributions as income
S.

..

Recent statistics show that . . . [income] distributions . . . are about 2.8%

. . . [and] capital gain distributions . . . about 2.3%, so that to procure for the
investor a satisfactory yield both distributions would have to be regarded as income."
BOGERT § 115, at 306.
The court seemed to adopt this "subjective" approach in Coates v. Coates, 304
S.W.2d 874 (Mo. 1957), in which the instrument permitted the trustee to invest in
common stocks only with the approval of the remaindermen. Since the remaindermen consented to the purchase 'of mutual fund shares with knowledge that all distributions would be taken in cash, they were held to be estopped from later claiming
that capital gain distributions should have been added to corpus.
Of the 35 states which tax capital gain distributions to the recipients, 18 tax
them as income and 14 as capital gain, irrespective of the recipient's election. Three,
however, tax them as income when received in cash, but treat them as capital when
taken in stock. Investment Company Institute, Memorandum to Investment Company Members (No. 2, 1961).
31 Normally, the investor's choice would be between the shares of different corporations. Occasionally, corporate dividend policy may provide a similar flexibility.
For example, Georgia Pacific Corp., whose shares now sell for about $55, pays a
quarterly dividend of 250 in cash and 1% in stock. A stockholder who sells the
stock dividends as he receives them has a 6% investment; one who retains them has
a 2% investment with greater growth potential.

1964]
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temporary effect of the present ruling may be to collect additional tax from
32
unwary or ill-advised taxpayers or their estates, its ultimate effect, by
requiring the addition of capital gain dividends to corpus as a condition of
deductibility, will be the elimination of mutual fund shares from charitable
3
remainder trust portfolios 3 and the substitution of other high-yielding
securities the distributions from which will be unambiguously defined as
income. Since the price of common stocks frequently reflects expectations
of capital enhancement, the probable tendency will be toward bonds and
preferred stocks with little or no chance for capital growth. In an inflapower
tionary environment this will result in the erosion of the purchasing
34
of the charitable interest, even if the dollar value is maintained
It would be unrealistic to permit deduction of charitable remainders
whenever the trust instrument does not expressly authorize invasion of the
corpus; some allocations of trust receipts, such as payment of the total
proceeds of an annuity contract to the life tenant, obviously constitute a
de facto depletion of the principal 3 5 The problem is to distinguish the
trust which contemplates only reasonable investment discretion consistent
with its legitimate purpose from that which is designed to defeat or diminish
the charitable interest or, "by reason of all the conditions and circumstances," 36 is likely to have that effect. The Commissioner's definitional
test that all distributions to the life tenant be "clearly income" has three
serious drawbacks. It imposes an impossible burden of proof on the taxpayer-it implies, for example, that a deduction for a charitable income
interest in a trust requiring allocation of mutual fund capital gain dividends
to corpus would be disallowed on the grounds that such dividends were not
"clearly capital." Also, it unduly restricts investment flexibility-a logical
extension of its rationale would reach stock dividends, subscription rights,
3 7
and other corporate distributions which have ambivalent characteristics,
thus effectively excluding from charitable remainder trust portfolios shares
in corporations which regularly make such distributions in lieu of cash
dividends. 38 Finally, it fails to reach other common allocations which result
32
Insofar as the ruling results in allocation of capital gain dividends to corpus
when they might otherwise have been paid to the life tenant its effect will be to
reduce income tax revenues.
33 See BOGERT § 105, at 280. "[I]f . . . capital gains distributions . . . are to
be allocated to the capital . . . there would seem to be . . . a violation of the
duty of impartiality by the trustee . . . since he is taking a sub-normal income for
Since the promulgation of
. ."
the purpose of securing additions to the capital ..
the present ruling, it is the practice for draftsmen, as a matter of convenience, to
exclude mutual funds as permissible trust investments or to provide that capital gain
dividends shall be credited to principal. Interview With George Craven, Esq., in
Philadelphia, Dec. 26, 1963.
34 See statistics tabulated in note 52 infra.

35 Other examples of "wasting property" are copyright and patent rights, claims
for renewal commissions, or a landlord's interest in a favorable lease. See UNrFoRa!
AcT § 11; BOGERT § 122.
36

25.2522(a)-2(b)
37 Treas. Reg. §§20.2055-2(b),

(1958).

Proper allocation or apportionment of such distributions has frequently been
the subject of litigation and comment. See UNIFoam AcT § 6; BOGERT §§ 115-17; 112
U. PA. L. REv. 290 (1963) (particularly regarding stock dividends).
38 See note 31 sup ra. Another unusual example is Citizens Utilities Corp. which
has two classes of common stock, class A paying only stock dividends and class B
paying the equivalent amount in cash.
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39
in capital depletion-rents from depreciable real estate, interest from
bonds purchased at a premium,40 and corporate cash dividends in excess
of current earnings 41 are all items which are customarily regarded as
"clearly income"; yet a trust invested entirely in such assets and requiring
allocation of all receipts to the life tenant would evidence an unmistakable
intent to afford him with an above-average income at the expense of the
corpus. 42 A deduction for the remainder interest in such a trust would
seem properly denied or reduced since the actual subject matter of the
43
deduction is the property that the charity will ultimately receive.
A more meaningful approach would avoid a seemingly futile attempt
to categorize the distributions and, instead, analyze the character of the
assets which the instrument contemplates will remain in the trust after
the distributions have been made. Then, assuming future price stability,
a determination should be made as to whether it is reasonably probable that
the value of these assets will be diminished by the time the remainderman
takes.4 The suggested standard of reasonable probability, although different from the "remote possibility" standard applied when the trust instru45
is already embodied in
ment expressly provides for invasion of corpus,
46
The validity of
tables
valuation
of
the
the
use
the Regulations through
future interest
of
a
value
present
the
to
determine
these tables as a device

3 UNIFoRm AcT § 3(a) (1) defines rent as income, but § 13(a) (2) suggests that
depreciation be deducted. "[B]y the weight of authority a trustee is not allowed or
required to follow this procedure." BOGERT § 114, at 300.
40
UIFORm Acr § 7(a) does not require amortization of bond premiums. The
rationale that premiums and discounts would "wash out" is inapplicable when the
trust assets consist only of bonds inventoried at higher than redemption value or when
the trustee is directed to purchase only bonds selling at a premium. See BOGERT § 113.
41
UNiFORm AcT § 6(d) seems to indicate that all cash dividends are income
unless designated as liquidating dividends pursuant to § 6(b) (3).
42
In another ruling dealing with allocation of receipts in a charitable remainder
trust, the Commissioner has held that no deduction will be allowed for "a remainder
in subsurface [mineral] rights . . . where there is no provision for withholding and
adding to corpus such reserves for depletion . . . as are adequate, according to
accepted accounting and engineering principles, to maintain the corpus intact . .. .
Rev. Rul. 60-162, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 376. The crucial factor distinguishing that
ruling from the present ruling is that, in the case of depletable natural resources,
well-established principles require apportionment in order to preserve the integrity
of the remainder interest. UNrFORm Act § 9 suggests apportionment. See BOGERT
§122.
43 The Regulations make no reference to the character of the distributions but
require only that the value of the remainder be ascertainable. See Treas. Reg.
§20.2055-2(a) (1958), quoted in note 7 supra.
44 It is not suggested that such a determination is free from difficulty; but some
reasonable assumptions can be made. For example, property subject to physical
depreciation or depletion, in the absence of appreciation in real estate values, would

clearly be worth less. Compare Rev. Rul. 60-162, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 376. Bonds
should approach their face value as maturity nears; shares of common stock, in the
absence of special information about particular corporations, would have to be assumed
to retain their current market value. In a mutual fund, where the value is directly
related to the value of the underlying assets, the character of those assets should
be examined.
45 See notes 8-11 supra and accompanying text.
46 Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-7(f), 25.2512-5(f) (1958).
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47
rests on three probabilities-the life expectancy of the income cestui,
a constant interest rate (now three and one-half percent), and the constant
value of a trust corpus consisting of either "money or property." 48 There
is certainly more than a remote possibility that the income beneficiary will
outlive his expectancy, that interest rates will rise, or that the trust property, whether it be stocks, bonds, or real estate, will decline in value.
Judged by this standard it is doubtful that the present ruling should be
retained. It is improbable, in a period of known price stability, that independent mutual fund managements whose compensation is based on a percentage of total fund assets 49 would, contrary to their own interest, realize
capital gains, distribute them to shareholders, 50 and thus deplete the asset
value of the shares. 51 It would be far more likely that they would either
avoid realizing gains or seek to realize offsetting losses thus maintaining
their compensation base and, consequently, the intact value of the shareholders' investment. Past experience has shown that the net asset value
of mutual fund shares, the property that would remain in the trust corpus,
52
It
compares favorably with the value of other available investment media.
47
Probability at the time the trust takes effect governs even if subsequent events
establish certainty. Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929).
Despite differences in the actuarially determined life expectancy of men and women,
the valuation tables do not distinguish on the basis of the sex of the life tenant.
48 Treas. Reg. §§20.2055-2(a), 25.2522(a)-2(a) (1958).
49 See Wellington Fund, Prospectus, April 1, 1963 (Supp. Oct 21, 1963), pp. 3, 4.
50 While a mutual fund is not compelled to distribute realized capital gains,
Conviser v. Simpson, 122 F. Supp. 205 (D. Md. 1954), the tax law, by permitting
a deduction by the fund for the distributions, acts as a powerful incentive to distribute.
INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 852(3) (A).
51 Since the market price of shares in open-end funds is determined solely by
their net asset value, a distribution necessarily reduces the market value. The market
price of shares in closed-end funds must, for the purposes of this analysis, be assumed
to vary directly with the value of the fund's underlying assets.
U.S.
Corp.
Rail
Utility
Indus.
Mutual
52
Bonds
Bonds
Stocks
Stocks
Stocks
Funds
Year
100
100
100
100
100
100
1954
96
97
112
103
121
110
1955
90
87
105
111
124
113
1956
95
90
67
111
108
97
1957
86
84
108
147
145
127
1958
79
79
105
142
168
131
1959
87
81
90
161
153
127
1960
83
80
99
208
181
147
1961
86
83
97
208
162
127
1962
83
81
123
224
189
141
1963
In all indices, 1954 = 100. Mutual Fund index represents the weighted average of
the year-end net asset values of Wellington Fund, Affiliated Fund, and Massachusetts
Investors Trust. Stock indices are the Dow Jones year-end values. Bond indices
are closing Standard & Poor's indices for high grade bonds and U.S. Government
long term bonds.
Despite the fact that all three mutual funds involved distributed realized capital
gains to their stockholders in every year during this period, the overall performance
throughout the period was exceeded only by the utility and industrial stocks. In
only one year was the mutual fund index lower than its 1954 value, while the rail
stock index was below 100 in four subsequent years and neither bond index ever
attained its initial level. The mutual fund index suffered a year-to-year decline only
three times while the rail stock index declined in five years and both bond indices
during six. Performance correlates quite closely with the industrial stock index
with the total appreciation being about half in percentage.
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is possible that a given mutual fund management might adopt a planned
program of asset depletion by realizing gains, distributing them to shareholders, and retaining only depreciated investments in the fund. 3 The
shares in such a fund would become an inappropriate trust investment; but
this is equally true of the shares of any corporation which embarked on a
program of asset disposal and distribution of dividends in excess of current
operating earnings.M Unless the trust instrument otherwise provided,
there would be an implied duty for the trustee either to dispose of such
shares or to apportion the dividends between the life tenant and the remainderman.5 5 It would be entirely reasonable for the Commissioner to
require an express statement of this duty in every charitable remainder
trust as a condition of deductibility, but it is difficult to justify his present
position which implies that such a statement is unnecessary when the trust
may not hold mutual fund shares and inadequate when it may.
Both the present ruling and Revenue Ruling 60-162 5r indicate the
Commissioner's concern that a charitable remainder trust may be used as a
vehicle to obtain tax deductions while indirectly defeating the charitable
interest, thereby circumventing Congress' purpose to tax private income,
bequests, and gifts.5 7 If comprehensive standards to prevent such abuse are
required, however, they should not restrict reasonable investment discretion,
nor discriminate among available investment media. Furthermore, unless
the instrument, the identity of the trustee, or other "conditions or circumstances" 58 suggest a reasonable probability that the value of the assets in
the corpus will be reduced, there should be a presumption that the trust will
be administered in accordance with established fiduciary principles to protect
the separate interest of the charitable remainderman. The adoption of unreasonable or overly restrictive standards may have the effect of frustrating
Congress' equally manifest purpose to encourage, through the medium of
tax deductions, charitable gifts and bequests.
53 The close regulation of such companies by the Securities and Exchange Commission would seem to require a clear statement of such an intent to the shareholders.
See Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat 836, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(d) (1958).
5The Commissioner points out, to support his position, that mutual fund capital
gain "distributions may be and frequently are paid during a decline in portfolio values,
and are not limited by the athount of the decline . . . ." Letter, p. 3. In an ordinary
corporation, prudent management may preclude dividend payments in excess of current earnings, except as a temporary measure; but there are no reasons why they
could not make such payments.
55 See BOGERT §§ 108, 122. Insofar as a trust instrument which requires investment in mutual fund shares and allocation of all distributions to income may be construed to relieve the trustee of this duty, the present ruling is correct. See note 20
supra.
56 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 376, note 42 supra.
57 See Brown, The Tax Use of Charitable Trusts, 39 TAXES 748, 749 (1961).
58 Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2055-2(b), 25.2522(a)-2(b) (1958).

